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SLAVERY’S CONSTITUTION: RETHINKING THE
FEDERAL CONSENSUS
Maeve Glass*
For at least half a century, scholars of the early American Constitution
have noted the archival prominence of a doctrine known as the “federal
consensus.” This doctrine instructed that Congress had no power to
interfere with the institution of slavery in the states where it existed. Despite
its ubiquity in the records, our understanding of how and why this doctrine
emerged is hazy at best. Working from a conceptual map of America’s
founding that features thirteen local governments coalescing into two
feuding sections of North and South, commentators have tended to explain
the federal consensus either as a vestige of a much older constitutional
tradition rooted in localism or as the result of a brokered political
compromise between the sections. Cast as an archaic relic of the colonial
era or as a one-off political compromise, the doctrine has appeared in the
most recent scholarship as one that by the mid-1800s had devolved into a
limp and unpersuasive rhetorical disclaimer.
This Essay offers a different origins story for the federal consensus, one
that invites us to re-center the doctrine’s central importance in the founding
constitutional order. Drawing on a model of inquiry that expands the
conventional map of America’s founding to include the material modes of
production and exchange, this Essay allows us to see how the bedrock
principle of noninterference emerged not only from the oft cited vestiges of
localism and sectionalism but also from the customary practices and
exigencies of long-distance maritime trade in the Atlantic world. As
economic historians have shown, long before the doctrine appeared in print
in 1790, America’s merchant class had forged a trading network along the
Atlantic coast, creating an interregional economy that spanned from the
Massachusetts Bay to the plantation coast and outer-lying islands.
Predicated on a rule of noninterference with the underlying modes of
enslaved labor on which white wealth depended, these preexisting norms of
racialized property ownership and commercial exchange provided a useful
starting point for the rules of constitutional union at a time when the concepts
and structures of public law constitutional governance in the newly created
United States remained inchoate and ill-defined.
* Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. This Essay was prepared for the

Symposium entitled The Federalist Constitution, hosted by the Fordham Law Review on
October 2, 2020, at Fordham University School of Law.
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By recovering this genealogy and expanding our map of the founding, this
Essay offers a more complete view of the origins of one of the oldest and most
consequential rules of constitutional union. In doing so, it allows us to see
the institution of racial slavery not simply as one confined to a single section
of the South and upheld by its peculiar doctrine of states’ rights but as a
fundamentally American institution, one upheld by a rule of federal and state
inaction in the face of slavery’s systemic taking of Black lives.
INTRODUCTION
In the early months of 1790, members of the U.S. House of
Representatives gathered in the temporary seat of government in New York
City and announced a constitutional doctrine that would sound in the halls of
national governance and courts of adjudication for decades to come.1 The
doctrine, laid down in a committee report drafted in response to a petition by
the Pennsylvania Abolition Society,2 declared that the newly created
Congress of the United States had no power to interfere with the institution
of slavery in the states where it existed.3 Termed the “federal consensus” by
a legal scholar who caught sight of it in the archives in the 1970s, this rule of
noninterference reverberated across the long nineteenth century.4 Today, one
can see it coursing through the records of subsequent congressional debates,5
hear its logic at work in the judicial opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court,6
and observe from afar as it provided the opening script for a newly elected
president who, on the eve of the Civil War, offered a solemn promise that in

1. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1524 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
2. Memorial of the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery to the
Senate and House of Representatives of the United States (Feb. 3, 1790), as transmitted in
Letter from Benjamin Franklin to John Adams (Feb. 9, 1790) (on file with the National
Archives).
3. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1524 (1790) (“That Congress have no authority to interfere in the
emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them within any of the States; it remaining with
the several States alone to provide any regulations therein, which humanity and true policy
may require.”).
4. See JAMES OAKES, FREEDOM NATIONAL: THE DESTRUCTION OF SLAVERY IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1861–1865, at 2–8 (2013); DONALD ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE
OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 1765–1820 (1970); GEORGE WILLIAM VAN CLEVE, A SLAVEHOLDERS’
UNION: SLAVERY, POLITICS, AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC
(2010); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTI-SLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN
AMERICA, 1760–1848, at 16 (1977); SEAN WILENTZ, NO PROPERTY IN MAN: SLAVERY AND
ANTISLAVERY AT THE NATION’S FOUNDING 162–63 (2018); Howard A. Ohline, Slavery,
Economics, and Congressional Politics, 1790, 46 J.S. HIST. 335 (1980).
5. See, e.g., 11 REG. DEB. 1464 (1835) (statement of Rep. Francis Jackson) (referring to
men who “disclaim all interference, or disposition to interfere, with the rights of property in
slaves, or control over the slave question, within the jurisdiction of the slave-holding States”);
Republican Platform of 1860, reprinted in NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1850–1956, at 31,
32–33 (Donald B. Johnson & Kirk H. Porter eds., 2d ed. 1956); see also CONG. GLOBE, 36th
Cong., 1st Sess. 568–576 (1860) (statement of Hon. Henry Wilson).
6. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), superseded by
constitutional amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.)
499 (1842).
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America, no one would interfere with the institution of slavery in the states
where it existed.7
Despite its prominence in the archival records, our understanding of how
and why this doctrine emerged remains hazy at best. To date, two different
views stand out. The first, and perhaps the most familiar, attributes the rule
to the long-standing and deeply embedded practice of local self-governance
under the British Empire.8 The second view counters that, far from simply
the inevitable product of localism and faith in a limited central government,
the rule is best understood as the product of a brokered sectional compromise
in the early 1790s, as Northern congressmen set out to secure Southern votes
for pending legislation.9 Working from these depictions of the doctrine as
either an antiquated vestige of the colonial past or a one-off political
compromise, recent scholarship has invited us to see the doctrine as one that,
by midcentury, had devolved into political rhetoric, overshadowed by the rise
of a powerful antislavery movement that looked to the power of the national
government and seized on the Constitution’s underlying abolitionist
potential.10
This Essay offers a different origins story for the federal consensus, one
that invites us to re-center its place in the founding constitutional order.
Drawing on a model of inquiry that expands the conventional map of
America’s founding to include the material modes of production and
exchange, this Essay allows us to see how the principle of noninterference
emerged not only from the oft cited vestiges of localism and sectionalism11
but also from the customary practices and material realities of long-distance
maritime trade in the Atlantic world.12
As economic historians discovered nearly four years ago, long before the
federal consensus first appeared in print in 1790, America’s merchants had
forged a robust trading network along the extended Atlantic coastline,
creating an interregional marketplace that linked the continent’s emerging
urban and commercial centers of the northern latitudes to the agricultural
zones of the southern latitudes and outer-lying islands of the Caribbean.13
7. Proclamation No. 17 (Emancipation Proclamation), 12 Stat. 1268 (1863); Abraham
Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in POLITICAL SPEECHES AND DEBATES OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND STEPHEN A. DOUGLAS 530 (Chicago, Scott, Foresman & Co. 1896).
8. See WIECEK, supra note 4, at 16; see also PAUL FINKELMAN, SLAVERY AND THE
FOUNDERS: RACE AND LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF JEFFERSON 104 (1996) (arguing that “the federal
consensus” of 1780 “was already in place”).
9. Ohline, supra note 4, at 336.
10. See, e.g., Matt Karp, The Mass Politics of Antislavery, 3 CATALYST 131 (2019). For
a similar characterization of the doctrine as one that meant little in practice, see OAKES, supra
note 4. For the recent historiography that has sought to emphasize the antislavery and
abolitionist nature of the Constitution, see WILENTZ, supra note 4. For a related turn towards
recovering the “abolitionist soul” in the Reconstruction Amendments, see Dorothy E. Roberts,
Abolitionist Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1, 50 (2019) (“The abolitionist soul of the
Reconstruction Amendments is experiencing a renaissance.”).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Parts II–III.
13. ARTHUR L. JENSEN, THE MARITIME COMMERCE OF COLONIAL PHILADELPHIA (1963);
William I. Davisson & Lawrence J. Bradley, New York Maritime Trade: Ship Voyage
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Although never as heavily trafficked as the transatlantic shipping lanes that
connected the ports of America to the central metropolis of the British
Empire, these lesser-known coastal conduits that spanned from the enclaves
of Boston, to Charleston, to the West Indies contributed to the ongoing
conceptualization and articulation of a defined economic space called
America. Dating back to the first exchanges of commodities between the
Massachusetts Bay and the James River in the early 1630s, these networks
rested on familiar mercantile practices of long-term contracting designed to
endogenize trust and norms of reciprocity, including the foundational
principle of noninterference with the modes of enslaved production on which
the accumulation of white wealth and power in America increasingly
depended.14
Far from remaining confined to a silo of economic space, these norms and
material realities of commercial partnership supplied a useful starting point
for fashioning the rules that would govern relations between the newly
created entities called united states.15 Most notably, when confronted in
1790 with the claim that the Constitution’s Preamble conferred on Congress
a power to abolish the institution of slavery, those who debated the question
and codified the federal consensus in print drew on the logic of the old
commercial American coast in two key ways. First, rather than rebutting the
claim of federal power with conventional constitutional arguments
predicated exclusively on states’ rights and sectional political bargains,
disputants who had come of age in an America where the territorial and
institutional boundaries of states and sections had yet to take on today’s
reified form described a fluid landscape of property owners engaged in
commerce, collectively bound by shared interests in preserving the mode of
enslaved production and ideologies of a racial caste hierarchy.16
Second, working from this envisioned landscape of the American coast,
disputants presented the proposed constitutional rule of noninterference not
simply as a rule that governed relations between strangers but also as a rule

Patterns, 1715–1765, 55 N.Y. HIST. SOC’Y Q. 309, 309 (1971); William I. Davisson, The
Philadelphia Trade, 3 WESTERN ECON. J. 310 (1965); Albert Fishlow, Antebellum
Interregional Trade Reconsidered, 54 AM. ECON. REV. 352, 362 (1974) (observing that
although the corridor constituted the most “important artery of interregional commerce,” it is
“one about which we know perhaps least”); Lawrence A. Herbst, Interregional Commodity
Trade from the North to the South and American Economic Development in the Antebellum
Period, 35 J. ECON. HIST. 264, 265 (1975); David C. Klingaman, The Coastwise Trade of
Colonial Massachusetts, 108 ESSEX INST. HIST. COLLECTIONS 217 (1972) [hereinafter
Klingaman, The Coastwise Trade of Colonial Massachusetts]; David C. Klingaman, The
Development of the Coastwise Trade of Virginia in the Late Colonial Period, 77 VA. MAG.
HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 26 (1969); Merl E. Reed, Footnote to the Coastwise Trade: Some Teche
Planters and Their Atlantic Factors, 8 LA. HIST. 191 (1967); James F. Shepherd & Samuel H.
Williamson, The Coastal Trade of the British North American Colonies, 1768–1772, 32 J.
ECON. HIST. 783 (1972).
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part II.
16. See infra Part II.
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that governed relations between sharers.17 In particular, rather than
describing the rule solely as the manifestation of an absolute, in rem right of
an individual property owner to exclude all strangers for all time (including,
say, the audience of citizen-petitioners who observed the congressional
debates from the galleries), disputants also characterized the rule as one that
governed consenting partners of the Atlantic coast: partners who had long
since agreed by mutual consent to forgo their right to interfere with the modes
of production in the plantations in pursuit of the profits to be gained from a
long-term commercial correspondence rooted in trust and reciprocity.18
By translating the records of these legislative debates using the preexisting
commercial lexicon of the coast, we can thus begin to better understand the
material roots and logic of the federal consensus. Far from simply a
manifestation of colonial-era localism or a one-off political bargain between
feuding sections, this was at its core a powerful legal doctrine that could be
actively enforced through a thick set of social and relational norms: whether
it be via sanctions brought against future abolitionists who might endeavor
to interfere with the institution of slavery or via regular informational
exchanges between elected officials in the halls of Congress, where
representatives of property owners who shared in the profits of enslavement
had agreed to delegate managerial control over the institution of racial
slavery to those who owned the land and labor of the plantations.
In the end, then, restoring this economic space and its internal ordering
mechanisms to the conventional map of America’s founding has two key
implications for how we understand slavery’s constitution. First, in terms of
methodology, it invites us to ask a new set of questions. Instead of continuing
to relitigate the familiar questions as to where, as between center and
periphery or as between North and South, power resided and when this
allocation of power was fixed for all time, we might productively ask how
older norms of commercial partnership interacted with newly emerging and
evolving norms of constitutional governance.
Second, and more
substantively, by encouraging us to explore how the resulting doctrine of
noninterference functioned to mediate relations between strangers as well as
sharers in the profits of racial enslavement, this shift invites us to see the
doctrine not simply as a rhetorical rule of inaction but rather, as a profoundly
consequential exercise of federal regulatory power that made possible the
systematic enslavement of Black people for white profit.
To begin the work of telling this story, this Essay commences in Part I with
a cursory tour of the American coast and its underlying norms of partnership,
as it existed prior to the creation of the U.S. Constitution. Part II then
explores how restoring this older world to the existing map of the coast’s
political space can help us to better translate the records of legislative debate
that gave rise to the codification of the federal consensus in 1790. A caveat:
17. For the conceptual framing of property’s multiple audiences of strangers and sharers,
see Thomas W. Merrill, Property and Sovereignty, Information and Audience, 18
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 417 (2017).
18. See infra Part II.
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a full account of this history is beyond the scope of this brief Essay. Instead,
the aim here is simply to suggest how expanding the analytical frame can
enrich our understanding of the origins and significance of the federal
consensus.
I. AMERICA’S FOUNDING ECONOMIC SPACE: PATHWAYS AND NORMS OF
PARTNERSHIP
In the waning decades of the British Empire’s rule in North America, the
merchant ships of New England hauled out each week from Boston with the
first fair winds, bound for the ports of the plantation coast.19 The largest
among them could carry the annual yield of four rice plantations,20 rendering
a single ship more than twice as valuable as a plantation boasting three
thousand acres of Carolina soil.21 The smaller vessels among them could
carry the full annual harvest of a single tobacco estate.22 Wide hulls and flat
bottoms, broad sails and shallow draughts, many of the vessels were designed
explicitly to go easily over the sandy bars that lined the southern coast to
where the harvest waited—“a treasure,” one Bostonian later observed,
“better than the mines of Peru.”23

19. See, e.g., Ship News, 5 ESSEX GAZETTE 85, 86 (1772); Custom-House, Port of Salem
& Marblehead, Jan. 4, 5 ESSEX GAZETTE 89, 91 (1773); Salem January 12: Custom-House,
Port of Salem & Marblehead, Jan. 11, 5 ESSEX GAZETTE 93, 95 (1773).
20. This figure is based on estimated yields of rice plantations in the early 1760s and the
carrying capacity of 180-ton ships. See Maurice A. Crouse, Gabriel Manigault: Charleston
Merchant, 101 S.C. HIST. MAG. 98, 103–04 (2000) (estimating that two of Gabriel Manigault’s
rice plantations produced 707 barrels); see also Charles-Town, May 21, 1763., S.C. GAZETTE,
May 21, 1763 (reporting that a 180-ton ship is thought to “carry 1100 barrels of rice”); Lynn
Harris, Charleston’s Colonial Boat Culture, 1668–1775, at 161 (2002) (Ph.D. dissertation,
University of South Carolina) (on file with author) (estimating a four-to-one ratio of rice
barrels to each ton of vessel weight).
21. See, e.g., Lynn Harris, Shipyards and European Shipbuilders in South Carolina (Late
1600s to 1800) 3 (1999) (unpublished manuscript), https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=mrd_pubs
[https://perma.cc/UB5M-XGBN]
(calculating that the planter and merchant Henry Laurens valued his 3000-acre plantation on
the Cooper River at 7000 pounds sterling and his one-quarter ownership in a ship at 4000
pounds, for a total valuation of 16,000 pounds sterling).
22. See, e.g., Letter from George Washington to Robert Cary & Co. (July 2, 1759), in 6
THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: COLONIAL SERIES 330, 330 (W. W. Abbott ed., 1988)
(“By the Fair American . . . I send you fifteen Hhds Tobo the whole Amount of the Estates
Crop this Year; one Hhd only excepted, which I could not get on board in time as it lay up
Pamunky River.”).
23. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 89 (Jonathan Elliot ed., Washington 2d ed. 1836) [hereinafter
ELLIOT’S DEBATES] (“I suppose the New England States have a treasure offered to them better
than the mines of Peru; and it cannot be to the disadvantage of the Southern States.”). See
London, August 10, NEW-ENGLAND WEEKLY J., Nov. 6, 1732; see also Imported in the Last
Ships from London and to Be Sold, BOS. NEWS-LETTER, July 24, 1760; State of NewHampshire, INDEP. CHRON. & UNIVERSAL ADVERTISER (Bos.), Nov. 15, 1781; Wanted on Hire,
N.H. GAZETTE, Nov. 9, 1770 (“Wanted on Hire, A Vessell . . . suitable for the Virginia or
Carolina Trade.”); Letter from Joseph Gerrish & John Barrell to Chauncey Townsend (June
14, 1738) (available in John Barrel, Letter Book, 1738–1760, on file with the New York
Historical Society) (“What ships we design for Carolina to sail from Boston in the Month of
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Unlike the wagons and trains that later crossed the continent and left
behind a grid of roads and iron rails, these ships left no trace on the swells of
the ocean and would soon disappear from the conventional map of America’s
constitutional founding.24 Indeed, for a long time afterwards, accounts of
colonial America would begin with an agrarian landscape defined by small
farms and isolated peripheries, perhaps slowly coalescing into soon-to-be
visible sections of an antislavery North and a proslavery South.25 Beginning
in the 1960s, however, a group of economic historians, curious as to what
happened along the waterways lining the rolling fields of farms and
plantations, set out to compile the movement of the merchant ships. Using
the new invention of a computer, researchers tabulated ship data from the
local customs offices and newspapers.26 Their work revealed a clearly
defined maritime economic space, one marked by pathways of commercial
partnership capable of linking the colonies together in what one scholar
described as “gossamer webs stronger than hooks of steel.”27
As historians who have explored these networks in more detail have
shown, this economic space dates back to at least the 1630s, when planters
in Virginia took stock of their surplus harvests and began to scan the coastline

Sep with a Cargo Suitable for the West Indias, where they may have a Chance for a Freight or
secure a Freight in the Spring.”).
24. See, e.g., Fishlow, supra note 13.
25. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 21 (2006)
(“British North America grew up not as one continental legal entity but rather as juridically
separate colonies founded over a span of many decades. . . . before 1776 . . . [the colonies]
were . . . as legally separate from one another as India and Ireland.”); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
LAW OF THE LAND: A GRAND TOUR OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC 23 (2015) (analogizing
the colonies to a “hub-and-spoke” model); JOHN WILLIAM BURGESS, THE MIDDLE PERIOD,
1817–1858, at 41 (1897); JOHN WILLIAM BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons 1897); JOHN FISKE, THE CRITICAL
PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1783–1789 (Boston, Houghton Mifflin & Co. 1888); JACK P.
GREENE, PERIPHERIES AND CENTER ix (1986) (using an imperial framework featuring thirteen
colonies as the periphery of an imperial metropolis in London); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE
FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 14 (2016) (noting that
in 1776, “most people still thought of their state as their country.”); PETER S. ONUF, THE
ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL CONTROVERSIES IN THE UNITED STATES,
1775–1787, at 130 (1983) (identifying the “thirteen colony-states” as the “basic components
of the American union”); FRANCIS AMASA WALKER, THE MAKING OF THE NATION, 1783–1817
(New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons 1895); GORDON S. WOOD, EMPIRE OF LIBERTY: A
HISTORY OF THE EARLY REPUBLIC, 1789–1815, at 2 (2009) (“Before the Revolution of 1776
America had been merely a collection of disparate British colonies.”); GORDON WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 359 (1969) (reflecting on the fractured
nature of the thirteen British colonies); Andrew C. McLaughlin, The Background of American
Federalism, 12 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 215 (1918); John M. Murrin, A Roof Without Walls: The
Dilemma of American National Identity, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION: ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION AND AMERICAN NATIONAL IDENTITY 336 (Richard Beemen et al. eds., 1987)
(arguing that “[t]he spectrum of seventeenth-century settlement produced, not one, but many
Americas, and the passage of time threatened to drive them farther apart, not closer together”).
26. See infra Part II.
27. See 2 WILLIAM BABCOCK WEEDEN, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF NEW
ENGLAND, 1620–1789, at 592 (1963).
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that led northward for nearby markets.28 “The Planters are carried with a
great forwardnes to seeke trade abroad, to which purpose we have now 7 or
8 pinnaces & Barques bound to New-England & the Northward,” the
governor of Virginia reported to London in 1631.29 Within two years, the
region had produced ten thousand bushels of corn for export to “their zealous
neighbours of New England,” he continued.30 In Massachusetts, meanwhile,
colonizers who looked over the unforgiving soil that would prove incapable
of sustaining a staple agricultural export crop began the work of building a
merchant fleet that could carry the produce of the plantations in the Americas
to the markets that would answer. “We are in a way of building shippes,”
the governor of Massachusetts reported in 1642.31 The “building of ships,”
the lawmakers later declared, was “of great importance for the common
good.”32
Over the next century, this preliminary conduit that connected the enclaves
of plantations along the James River to the shipyards of the Massachusetts
Bay became a heavily trafficked corridor within the broader Atlantic world,
weaving together the commercial and agricultural sectors of North
America.33 By 1732, for example, a census of ships anchored in Roanoke,
Virginia, found that nearly every other ship in the southern port was
registered to a merchant in New England.34 Records from the port of New
York, meanwhile, show that a third of all vessels between 1715 and 1765 had
been cleared for a port along the American coast.35
By the eve of the American Revolution, the corridor was crowded with
ships carrying the produce of the plantations to market, as food deficits in
New England led to increasing dependence on imports.36 During the first
half of the 1760s, for example, planters in Virginia and Maryland supplied
28. See Benjamin Callender, A Correct Chart of the East Coast of North America
(illustration) (1796), in CHARLES E. GOODSPEED COLLECTION (available at the Worcester Art
Museum).
29. Robert C. Johnson, Virginia in 1632, 65 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 458, 466
(1957).
30. Letter from Thomas Yong to Sir Tobie Matthew (Oct. 20, 1634), in 9 COLLECTIONS
OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY ser. 4, at 81, 110 (Boston, Massachusetts
Historical Society 1871).
31. New England’s First Fruits (Sept. 26, 1642), in 1 COLLECTIONS OF THE
MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY 248 (Boston, Monroe & Francis reprt. ed. 1806)
(1792).
32. Acts to Promote the Building of Good Ships, &c (ch. 91), reprinted in THE CHARTERS
AND GENERAL LAWS OF THE COLONY AND PROVINCE OF MASSACHUSETTS BAY 189 (Boston, T.
B. Wait & Co. 1814) (1671).
33. See Klingaman, The Coastwise Trade of Colonial Massachusetts, supra note 13, at
222.
34. ALEX ROLAND ET AL., THE WAY OF THE SHIP: AMERICA’S MARITIME HISTORY
REENVISIONED, 1600–2000, at 73 (2007).
35. Davisson & Bradley, supra note 13, at 314 (finding that, of the 2962 vessels recorded
in colonial records between 1715 and 1765, 849 cleared out for a port in the “American Coastal
Region”).
36. David Klingaman, Food Surpluses and Deficits in the American Colonies, 1768–1772,
31 J. ECON. HIST. 563 (1971) (“New England had probably been a net importer of foodstuffs
since early in the eighteenth century and by the 1760’s was dependent on external supply
sources for her marginal requirements in corn, wheat, and meat.”).
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78.9 percent of the corn and wheat imports for Massachusetts, while South
Carolina planters provided Massachusetts with 80 percent of its total rice
imports37 and North Carolina supplied 95 percent of Massachusetts’s
coastwise tar and turpentine imports necessary for the colony’s booming
shipbuilding industry.38 During the same five-year period, approximately 70
percent of sugar exported from Massachusetts was purchased by
Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Maryland, while 88 percent of the salt exported
from the West Indies went to the three southern colonies of Virginia, North
Carolina, and Maryland.39
In addition to generating profits for the merchants and planters who owned
the ships and lands along the American coast, this flourishing coastwise trade
contributed to the emergence of an ordering of the commercial space of
America quite different from the familiar landscape of isolated colonial
outposts and latent sections.40 As a return to the official reports and merchant
correspondence reveals, the movement of commodities across jurisdictional
borders contributed to a way of speaking about America in which these
bordered lines that have held center stage could recede into the backdrop of
commercial speech, as a landscape of interjurisdictional exchange,
predicated on internal norms of trust and reciprocity, came to the foreground.
To see how this commercial lexicon of America emerged, consider first
the corpus of navigational texts and sea charts produced to facilitate
movement along the coast. As these texts attest, the land that appears in
leading constitutional histories today as one defined by political and
jurisdictional spaces could also appear as part of an organic, smoothly hewn
wedge.41 “New England is that part of America in the Ocean Sea opposite
to Noua Alybon,” a captain describing the American coast had announced in
1616, and readers could imagine the way the land must have appeared to him
from under the shade of a full sail on a summer morning.42 “New France,
off it, is Northward,” he continued, and you could perhaps see the captain
nodding over his shoulder.43 “Southwardes is Virginia and all the adjoyning
Continent,” he continued, introducing his readers to a single coast that
seemed to have no beginning and no end.44
Those engaged in the work of overseeing the movement of ships along this
single sweep of coastline, meanwhile, presented the ports that began to
appear not simply as peripheral spokes on a wheel centered in a distant
37. Klingaman, The Coastwise Trade of Colonial Massachusetts, supra note 13, at 224.
38. Klingaman, supra note 36, at 224.
39. Klingaman, The Coastwise Trade of Colonial Massachusetts, supra note 13, at 226.
40. See supra note 25 (summarizing the organization of space in leading constitutional
histories of the United States).
41. See, e.g., RICHARD STACHURSKI, LONGITUDE BY WIRE: FINDING NORTH AMERICA 6–7
(2009); see also Christopher Tomlins, The Legal Cartography of Colonization, the Legal
Polyphony of Settlement: English Intrusions on the American Mainland in the Seventeenth
Century, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 315, 325 (2001) (describing cartographic representations of
North America as “pitched at the continental-coastal level”).
42. JOHN SMITH, A DESCRIPTION OF NEW ENGLAND 21 (Paul Royster ed., 2006) (1616).
43. Id.
44. Id.
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metropolis of London but also as entities linked to one another via the
accumulation of commodities. “Virginia is now become the granary of all
His Majesty’s northern colonies,” Governor John Harvey reported in 1634,
describing the colonies in economic relation to one another.45 “Boston [is]
the store of all the plantation commodities,” retorted another official in 1690,
once more offering a spoken geography of America in which commodities
moved across jurisdictional borders to accumulate in a single port.46
One could hear the same organization of space in the accounts that
merchants offered as they described the bustling trade that connected these
ports, presenting the names of America’s colonies according to the
geographic order in which a ship might sail down the coast and back again.
“Many of our ships go to Virginia, No and So Carolina,” a merchant in Boston
reported in 1763, verbally arranging the coast by following the movement of
a ship traveling northward to southward, before turning to the cargos the
ships carried: “[L]arge quantities of rum and other northern produce to
purchase rice, tobacco, and naval stores and take in freight for Great
Britain.”47 Others described the coast in geographic reverse, beginning with
the southernmost islands and then ranging back home northward: “[t]he
West Indias, South Carolina, Cape Fear, Virginia and Greenland . . . these
Places are the Ways by which we Generally Make our Remittance from New
England,” one trader observed to his partner in London in 1738, in which
names of colonies could appear interchangeably alongside names of capes
and islands and regions, all under the broad, undifferentiated category of
capitalized “Places” and capitalized “Ways.”48
In that land of movement along the American coast in the broader Atlantic
world, references to sectional blocks of north and south routinely gave to talk
of traveling to the northward and the southward,49 of vessels that ought to be
45. Harold B. Gill, Wheat Culture in Colonial Virginia, 52 AGRIC. HIST. 380, 380 (1978).
46. See MARGARET ELLEN NEWELL, FROM DEPENDENCY TO INDEPENDENCE: ECONOMIC
REVOLUTION IN COLONIAL NEW ENGLAND 75 (1998).
47. See CHARLES M. ANDREWS, THE BOSTON MERCHANTS AND THE NON-IMPORTATION
MOVEMENT 168 (1917).
48. Letter from Joseph Gerrish & John Barrell to Chauncey Townsend, supra note 23.
49. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 29, at 466 (“The Planters are carried with a great
forwardness to seeke trade abroad, to which purpose we have now 7 or 8 pinnaces & Barques
bound to New-England & the Northward.” (quoting Letter from the Governor & Council in
Virginia to the Lords (Mar. 6, 1631))); Letter from the Committee of Correspondence to
Charles Garth (Dec. 11, 1766), in 5 THE PAPERS OF HENRY LAURENS 216, 217–18 (Phillip May
Hamer et al. eds., 1968) (“Several of the Provinces Northward have the valuable Privilege of
choosing their own Sheriffs . . . .”); Letter from Jackson & Bromfield to Henry Bromfield &
Thomas Bromfield (Dec. 21, 1768), microformed on Lee Family Papers, Reel 18, Bound
Vols., 1764–1898 (Mass. Hist. Soc’y) (referring to a captain “well acquainted on the Shore to
the Southward of here”); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Page (Jan. 20, 1763), in 1 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 7, 7–8 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) (“I shall . . . return through
the British provinces to the northward home.”); Letter from Henry Laurens to Peter Broughton
(Oct. 1, 1765), in 5 THE PAPERS OF HENRY LAURENS, supra, at 13, 13–14 (“I am going on a
journey to the Southward of Georgia . . . .”); Letter from Colonel Lachlan McIntosh to George
Washington (Feb. 16 1776), in 3 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: REVOLUTIONARY
WAR SERIES 325, 325 (W. W. Abbot & Dorothy Twohig eds., 1988) (describing “other parts
to the southward”); Letter from George Washington to Robert Cary & Co. (Sept. 23 1761), in
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kept “constantly running, backward & forward”50 and “swimming
Nor’wardly”51 from the plantations of Virginia to the ports of Massachusetts.
There was a “swarm of Northward Men . . . in the River,” the Virginia planter
Benjamin Harrison observed to his business correspondent William Palfrey
in Massachusetts in 1772, peering down at the James River.52 The port of
Charleston, another merchant reported in 1763, “is glutted with all kinds of
Northern commodities,”53 owing perhaps, as the newspapers later reported,
to the “Rhode Islanders who come loaded with Rum and Small Truck . . . and
carry back Rice.”54
The captains who navigated the ships along these routes spoke in the same
vernacular, folding the land into a sea of movement, shaped by the winds and
the currents. “I had but got very little to the Southward and aimed to bear
away for Virginia,” one captain on a trading voyage reported, “until meeting
with a Calm in the Gulph Stream, it carried me so far to the Northward, that
I fetch’d but in with your capes, where I met the Wind at W.S.W., and ordered
the Vessel about to go to the Southward for Virginia.”55 At a time when such
voyages were at the whim of the elements, overland distances between the
ports could collapse, with one planter in Virginia predicting that the voyage
between Boston and the James River was shorter than that between Boston
and Philadelphia.56
Indeed, by the eve of the Revolution, it became possible to speak of the
coast as a single unit of production. “We should be glad of your Advice,
when you write us—what articles The Produce of this Country would serve
for an export,” a merchant in Newburyport wrote to his friend in London in
1768, offering up any of the various commodities that his ships could collect
from the entrepôts to the southward and bring to London,57 whether it be
flour from the Delaware River, tobacco from the James River, or rice and

7 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: COLONIAL SERIES, supra note 22, at 73, 73 (noting
the reasons that “inducd me to take a trip Northward”).
50. Letter from William Holt to William Palfrey (Mar. 16, 1765) (available in the Palfrey
Family Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University).
51. Letter from William Holt to William Palfrey (Mar. 2, 1765) (available in the Palfrey
Family Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University).
52. Letter from Benjamin Harrison to William Palfrey (Dec. 27, 1772) (available in the
Palfrey Family Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University).
53. Letter from Thomas Smith to Isaac Smith (Jan. 31, 1763), microformed on SmithCarter Papers, Reel 1, Loose Manuscripts (Mass. Hist. Soc’y) (discussing market prices at
Charleston, trade with New England, and family news); Letter from Benjamin Smith to Isaac
Smith (Jan. 21, 1764), microformed on Smith-Carter Papers, Reel 1, Loose Manuscripts
(Mass. Hist. Soc’y) (discussing South Carolina markets).
54. New-London, October 29, MASS. GAZETTE & BOS. POST-BOY & ADVERTISER, Oct. 25–
Nov. 1, 1773.
55. Philadelphia, August 16., BOS. POST-BOY, Aug. 27, 1750.
56. Letter from William Holt to William Palfrey, supra note 51 (“I think most Persons [in
Boston] would sooner rather to send [their ships] here [than Philadelphia] . . . . “Besides, the
Voyage here, I believe to be shorter.”).
57. Letter from Jackson & Bromfield to William Ogle & John Ogle (Mar. 4, 1768),
microformed on Lee Family Papers, Reel 18, Bound Vols., 1764–1898 (Mass. Hist. Soc’y).

1826

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

indigo from the Carolinas.58 Trading houses abroad, meanwhile, responded
with increasingly formalized sheets of paper listing the going prices for the
“Products of your Continent,”59 as a category of “American Produce,”60
emerged in print. Men spoke of ships traveling to “[t]his Part of the
World,”61 “this quarter of the world,”62 or “any part of the Globe,”63 while
expressing hopes and confidence of an “intercourse from this place to that
place.”64
This flourishing movement of ships and commodities that had helped
make it possible to conceptualize an economic space called America rested
on a vast trading network that spanned from Boston to the West Indies and
across the Atlantic. Built on much older practices and principles of
commercial exchange,65 this was a trading network that had emerged to
mitigate the enormous logistical and informational challenges of engaging in
long-distance maritime trade in the early modern world.66 Preserved in the
records of the leading trading houses of the American coast, this was a
network that connected merchants in port cities to planters who owned the
land and labor of the coast, as well as to the third-party commission agents
who acted as intermediaries.67
In its early iteration, this network was primarily limited to correspondents
who were related by kin, gradually expanding to include those who had been
58. Letter from Henry Lloyd to William Purviance (Oct. 7, 1765) (available in Henry
Lloyd Letter Book, 1765–1767, on file with the Baker Library, Harvard Business School).
59. Letter from John de Neufville to Lathrop & Coit (June 28, 1781) (on file with New
York Historical Society).
60. See, e.g., Norwich, February 24, NORWICH PACKET, Feb. 17–24, 1774.
61. Advertisement, PROVIDENCE GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., Feb. 13, 1768.
62. Letter from Jackson & Bromfield to Henry Croger (July 31, 1769), microformed on
Lee Family Papers, Reel 18, Bound Vols., 1764–1898 (Mass. Hist. Soc’y).
63. Letter from Stephen Hooper to John Reynell & Samuel Coates (Apr. 25, 1775),
(available in the Sol Feinstein Collection of the American Revolution, on file with the
American Philosophical Society Library).
64. Letter from Henry Lloyd to Hugh Hall Wentworth (Feb. 14, 1766) (available in Henry
Lloyd Letter Book, 1765–1767, on file with the Baker Library, Harvard Business School).
65. See generally XABIER LAMIKIZ, TRADE AND TRUST IN THE EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY
ATLANTIC WORLD (2010); Manuel Herrero Sánchez & Klemens Kaps, Connectors, Networks,
and Commercial Systems, in MERCHANTS AND TRADE NETWORKS IN THE ATLANTIC AND THE
MEDITERRANEAN 1 (Manuel Herrero Sánchez & Klemens Kaps eds., 2017); Francesca
Trivellato, Discourse and Practice of Trust in Business Correspondence During the Early
Modern Period (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Fordham Law Review); Francesca
Trivellato, Trading Diasporas and Trading Networks in the Early Modern Period (May 2004)
(Ph.D. dissertation, Brown University) (on file with the Fordham Law Review).
66. See Sánchez & Kaps, supra note 65, at 5 (“The aim of [early modern] commercial
networks was to overcome, or at least to reduce, the risks faced by early modern commercial
exchange, including the difficult enforcement of contracts, shipping accidents, delays caused
by weather and wars, slowness of information flow, and in relation to this, asymmetric
information.”); see also BERNARD BAILYN, THE NEW ENGLAND MERCHANTS IN THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 34–35 (1955); APRIL LEE HATFIELD, ATLANTIC VIRGINIA:
INTERCOLONIAL RELATIONS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 89 (2004); K. G. Davies, The
Origins of the Commission System in the West India Trade, 2 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ROYAL
HIST. SOC’Y 89 (1952); Emma Hart & Cathy Matson, Situating Merchants in Late EighteenthCentury British Atlantic Port Cities, 15 EARLY AM. STUD. 660 (2017).
67. See infra notes 90–129.
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vetted by existing members.68 Originating out of familial connections, the
rules that governed correspondents who participated in the trade did not
appear in any statute book. As one leading architect of the new republic later
put it, “Merchants of eminence will tell you, that they can trust their
correspondents without law; but they cannot trust the laws of the state in
which their correspondents live.”69
Instead, at the heart of this correspondence network that existed “without
law” lay the principle of mutual advantage: an expectation that any joint
venture would generate mutual returns for the parties involved. When, for
example, a young merchant in Newburyport drafted a letter to a commission
house in Philadelphia, he began with his hopes of establishing a
“[c]orrespondence for our mutual benefit.”70 Writing from the southward, a
merchant in Virginia recited the same phrase to a merchant in Providence,
Rhode Island, expressing his hope “of an advantageous Correspondence to
us both.”71 In earl 1777, meanwhile, a merchant in Boston penned a note to
his friend in Charleston, South Carolina, introducing a fellow merchant in
Portsmouth, Virginia, with the hope of “the beginning of a Correspondence
mutually profitable & agreeable.”72 And on the eve of peace, a merchant in
Baltimore, Maryland, wrote to a correspondent in Boston, expressing hopes
of inaugurating “some mercantile transactions . . . that may operate to our
reciprocal advantage.”73
In the pursuit of realizing these mutual profits, correspondents were
expected to share market information that, in turn, helped to promote trust
while also allowing each party a basis on which to decide whether and how
to proceed with any given venture. “[P]ermit me to ask how Flour of a good
quality would Sell in London?,”74 one planter inquired of his commission
agent, before peppering him with questions ranging from the cost of freight
to the commission fee.75 “I Shall . . . be much obliged to be often Informd
of your Prices for Bread, Flower, Corn, Barr & Pig Iron . . . Rum, Molasses
Loaf & Muscovado Sugars, Candles, Prk etc.,” William Lux of Baltimore
wrote to a friend in Boston in July of 1768, observing that “Distance of miles
does not Create distance of Sentiments.”76 Such market information could
68. See HATFIELD, supra note 66, at 34–35, 89.
69. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 23, at 282.
70. Letter from Jonathan Jackson to Samuel Smith & Son (Oct. 12, 1765) (on file with the
Baker Library, Harvard Business School).
71. Letter from Carter Braxton to Nicholas Brown & Co. (Feb. 1, 1763) (on file with
Brown University Library, Digital Repository).
72. Letter from Jackson, Tracy & Tracy to Henry Crouch (Feb. 5, 1777) (on file with the
Baker Library, Harvard Business School).
73. Letter from William Hammond to Willing, Morris & Senwick (May 3, 1784)
(available in William Hammond, Letter Book, 1784–1786, on file with the New York
Historical Society).
74. Letter from George Washington to Robert Cary & Co. (June 1, 1774), in 10 THE
PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON: COLONIAL SERIES, supra note 22, at 82, 83.
75. Id.
76. Letter from William Lux to John Bradford (July 15, 1768), reprinted in Pamela Satek,
William Lux of Baltimore: 18th-Century Merchant 762 (1974) (M.A. thesis, University of
Maryland) (on file with the Fordham Law Review)

1828

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

also be volunteered. “We are starving for want of provisions,” a merchant in
Charleston wrote to his correspondent in Newburyport in 1766, and “are
much in want of your country produce—not one Potatoe yet from the
Charleston “is glutted with all kinds of Northern
northward.”77
commodities,” one correspondent warned his partner in Boston, whom he
encouraged to find something else to ship.78
Perhaps of most consequence, in addition to sharing market information,
correspondents were expected to exercise their best judgment and make
business decisions that would advance the interests of their partners. Owing
to the physical geographies that separated correspondents from one another
and the intricacies of doing business in any given jurisdiction, merchants
routinely deferred to the decisions of their correspondents. As one merchant
put it, a correspondent “cannot at that distance give his orders with such
precision as they could wish, they must leave a great deal to my Prudence.”79
In practice, this meant that merchants engaged in commerce along the
American coast regularly agreed not to interfere with the business decisions
of their partners, preferring instead to appeal to their shared interests in
generating a profit from carrying the commodities of the coast to market.
“Gent.,” one merchant in Newburyport wrote to his correspondents in
Philadelphia, “I will leave it to your discretion & as you would act for
yourselves, act for me.”80 Working under this delegation of broad discretion,
correspondents routinely assured each other that they had taken all efforts to
protect and advance the material interests of the other party. “All that we can
further say is, that every thing has been done for your Interest that was in our
power & that we shall continue so to act until the business is completed,”
Henry Laurens, a merchant in Charleston and a future president of the
Continental Congress, wrote to his correspondents in Providence, Rhode
Island.81 “I have acted for him, as I would in the same situation wish him to
so for me,” echoed William Lux of Baltimore.82
Guided by these foundational principles of a correspondence predicated on
the promise of mutual advantage and delegated decision-making authority,
merchants in the New England region who engaged in direct correspondence
with planters abided by a tacit, at times explicit, agreement that decisions
regarding the enslaved labor force upon which their joint profits rested
remained entirely under the management of the plantation’s ownership. As
77. New-London, October 29, MASS. GAZETTE & BOS. POST-BOY & ADVERTISER, Oct. 25–
Nov. 1, 1773.
78. Letter from Thomas Smith to Isaac Smith (Jan. 21, 1764), microformed on SmithCarter Papers, Reel 1, Loose Manuscripts (Mass. Hist. Soc’y).
79. Letter from William Lux to William Mollesan (Feb. 9, 1767) (available in William
Lux Letter Book, 1763–1769, on file with the New York Historical Society).
80. Letter from Johnathan Jackson to Sam Smith & Son (Nov. 15, 1765) (on file with the
Baker Library, Harvard Business School).
81. See Henry Laurens to Samuel Vernon & William Vernon (July 5, 1756), reprinted in
2 THE PAPERS OF HENRY LAURENS, supra note 49, at 238, 239; see also Letter from Henry
Laurens to Thomlinson, Trecothick & Co. (July 11, 1757), reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF
HENRY LAURENS, supra note 22, at 406, 407.
82. Letter from William Lux to William Mollesan, supra note 79.
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their correspondence suggests, merchants and planters instead confined the
topic of their business correspondence to the exchange of market information
and the logistics of any given venture, with only occasional reference to the
lives and labor of those held in bondage under local laws of property.
Consider, for example, the letters exchanged between William Palfrey, a
Boston merchant who served as a clerk to the future president of the Second
Continental Congress, and Benjamin Harrison V, a Virginia planter who
became a signer of the Declaration of Independence. In a northwardsouthward correspondence that spanned multiple years, these participants in
the coastal trade, who later assumed leadership roles in the new republic,
shared and solicited information as to the supply and demand for various
grain commodities, without engaging in discussions about the underlying
modes of enslaved production. “I am the best provided . . . of any man in
this Country,” wrote Harrison to Palfrey in July of 1768,83 and there was no
mention of the 110 people whom Harrison held imprisoned as an enslaved
labor force.84 “I shall be glad of your advice as often as convenient of the
state of your market,” Harrison continued, following the familiar script by
which correspondents exchanged market information for mutual
advantage.85 “The first opportunity I have I shall ship you a quantity of Bread
& Flour, we have the Largest and best Crop of Wheat ever known in the
Country,” he promised.86 “I hope you have received my letter by your sloop
with the bread and flour,” he wrote, and once again, the ships and their cargos
appeared untethered from the land upon which the commerce rested.87
The same bracketing of the institution of racial slavery appeared in letters
that traveled between Palfrey and the mayor of Williamsburg, Virginia. “I
am further obliged to you for your endeavor to assist me in the sale of Flour,”
the mayor, William Holt, wrote to Palfrey,88 and there was no reference to
the ten enslaved people whom the mayor held in bondage.89 “I tried to get
181 for your Tobacco,” he continued; and notice how a Massachusetts

83. Letter from Benjamin Harrison to William Palfrey (July 22, 1768) (available in the
Palfrey Family Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University).
84. See Appraisement of the Estate of Benjamin Harrison of Berkeley, July 1791, as
exhibited in Exhibit 14: Berkley Plantation—Independence for Some, FREEDOM’S JUBILEE:
AN AFRICAN AM. JOURNEY, http://databases.charlescity.org/freedom/exhibit14.shtml [https://
perma.cc/Z343-9UN8] (last visited Mar. 16, 2021).
85. Letter from Benjamin Harrison to William Palfrey (Oct. 1, 1767) (available in the
Palfrey Family Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University).
86. Letter from Benjamin Harrison to William Palfrey, supra note 83.
87. Letter from Benjamin Harrison to William Palfrey (Mar. 3, 1768) (available in the
Palfrey Family Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University).
88. Letter from William Holt to William Palfrey (Apr. 28, 1765) (available in the Palfrey
Family Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University).
89. See David Gerard Null, The Library of Francis Jerdone 14 (Aug. 1978) (M.A. thesis,
College of William & Mary) (W&M ScholarWorks) (stating that William Holt held, in
partnership with Reverend Charles Jeffrey Smith, 2500 acres in the Virginia counties of New
Kent and Charles City, including Providence Forge); Providence Forge, 5 WM. & MARY
COLL. HIST. Q. MAG. 22 (1896) (discussing a mortgage deed made by William Holt on January
1, 1775, showing that he had “ten slaves ‘employed in the forge,’” along with “eight women
and two boys”).
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merchant became the holder of a commodity grown by enslaved people on
the banks of the southern plantation coast.90
This tacit agreement among correspondents to accept the underlying
modes of enslaved production and focus instead on ensuring the smooth
exchange of commodities for profit could also appear explicitly. Consider,
for example, a letter dispatched by William Byrd II, in Westover, Virginia,
to his colleague in Salem, Massachusetts.91 Remembered by historians today
as a rapist and sadist who described in remarkable detail the gruesome
violence he wrought on the Black children and women whom he enslaved,92
Byrd had taken it upon himself to write to his Massachusetts correspondent
to report an incident involving a crew from a New England cargo ship who
had dropped anchor near Byrd’s waterfront plantation in the Tidewater.
“Some of these Banditti anchor near my estate,” he wrote his friend in
Salem.93 They had come, he continued, “for the advantage of traffiquing
with my slaves, from whom they are sure to have good Penny worths.”94 For
Byrd, this interference with the rights of his claimed property was
inexcusable. Rather than risking a direct confrontation with the crew
members whom he accused of having trespassed on his claimed personal
property, Byrd instead asked that his correspondent intervene to see to it that
such interferences did not happen again.95 “I would you would be so kind as
to hang up all your Felons at home, and not send them abroad to discredit
their country in this manner,” he wrote, appealing to his correspondent to
ensure that a long-standing principle of noninterference became a
prerequisite for future movement along the American coast.96
When correspondents did discuss the enslaved labor that lay at the heart of
the plantation economy, one could sometimes see hints of a racial caste order
that traversed the coast’s jurisdictional borders. Return again to the
correspondence between Harrison, the Virginia planter who would sign his
name to the Declaration of Independence, and Palfrey, the Massachusetts
clerk of the future president of the Second Continental Congress.97 In a
folded letter that traveled between the two future leaders in the summer of
1772, Harrison told the story of a cargo ship that had recently arrived from
Newport, Rhode Island, at the end of his private dock on the James River.98
The ship, the planter explained, carried a “consignment of Negroes”; a

90. Letter from William Holt to William Palfrey, supra note 88 (emphasis added).
91. Letter from William Byrd II to Benjamin Lyne (Feb. 20, 1735), reprinted in Letters
of William Byrd, 2d, of Westover Va. (pt. 2), 9 VA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 225, 243–44
(1902).
92. Rebecca Anne Goetz, Exposing Early Histories of Race, Misogyny, and Power in the
Old Dominion, 43 REVS. AM. HIST. 210 (2015).
93. Letter from William Byrd II to Benjamin Lyne, supra note 91.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See supra notes 111–18.
98. Letter from William Holt to William Palfrey (Aug. 13, 1772) (available in the Palfrey
Family Papers, Houghton Library, Harvard University).
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consignment, he continued, that his son had ordered from Rhode Island.99
The letter told of how the ship’s captain, who was also a part owner in the
vessel and feeling unwell, was invited to come ashore and follow the path
that led up from the dock to rest in Harrison’s estate that looked over the river
below.100 The letter, as was custom, made no reference to the Black people
who remained on the ship at the end of the planter’s dock in the suffocating
July heat, their lives instead dismissed under the abstract reference to a
“consignment of Negroes.”101 Nor, moreover, was there reference to the
name of the young Black girl whom the ship captain had allowed his first
mate to sell to the planter’s overseer.102 Instead, the letter spoke only of the
smallpox that the ship’s captain had brought to the “Crop Negroes,” whose
suffering was of relevance to the conversation only for what it might mean
for the prospects of next year’s harvest and the joint profits of their future
ventures.103
Taken together, these archival fragments invite us to consider how the
daily movement of cargo ships along the American coast rested not only on
an agreement among correspondents to defer to the underlying laws and
practices of property in persons but also on a shared lexicon that traversed
jurisdictional borders and reduced Black people to consignments of
collective commodities. By the eve of the Revolution, these underlying
norms of noninterference with the institution of racial slavery had been in
place for at least a century, kept afloat in a corpus of commercial
correspondence in which America could appear not as a coast of fragments
but as a single smoothly hewn wedge of soil, in which those who owned the
ships and the land and the labor had reached a tacit agreement that the pursuit
of mutual advantage rested on noninterference with the institution of
enslavement upon which white wealth rested.
II. THE FIRST CONGRESS: CODIFYING A DUTY OF NONINTERFERENCE
In the opening months of 1790, while the merchant ships along the old
American coast continued to sail, the lawmakers of the new nation assembled
for the second session of the First Congress.104 At the time, basic questions
about the newly created political space of the United States remained
unsettled. To begin with, none of the Constitution’s named institutions of
governance had secured a firm physical foothold in the soil.105 Congress, for
example, had yet to find a permanent institutional home, such that it appeared
in a contemporary drawing as a ship, descending along the Atlantic coast in
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Letter from Benjamin Harrison to William Palfrey, supra note 52.
104. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 968 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834) (announcing the opening
of the “Second Session of the First Congress, begun in the city of New York on January 4,
1790”).
105. See generally JAMES STERLING YOUNG, THE WASHINGTON COMMUNITY, 1800–1828
(1966).
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search of a place where its representatives could meet to exchange
information.106 States, meanwhile, remained similarly indeterminate, with
legal identities that remained an object of considerable debate and territorial
borders that were often at best only vaguely defined.107 The situation was
little better in the executive branch, where the question as to what title to use
to address the president of the United States had inspired months of
acrimonious debate.108
Paralleling these basic questions surrounding the ontological nature of the
Constitution’s institutional structures lay a substantive question of
constitutional law: whether the new federal government had acquired any
powers with regard to the institution of slavery. As recent scholarship has
helped illuminate, almost immediately following the ratification of the
document, prominent abolitionists along the American coast seized on the
possibility that the Constitution held within it an implied federal power to
abolish the institution of slavery.109 Among those who were at the helm of
this initiative was the Pennsylvania Abolitionist Society, whose members
began drafting a petition to Congress in early 1790.110 Signed by the
society’s president, Benjamin Franklin, the petition argued that although the
power to abolish slavery was not among the enumerated powers in Article I,
the Constitution’s Preamble contained language that, at least on one reading,
vested the federal government with power to emancipate those held in
bondage.111 As the petition explained, “The[] [petitioners] have observed
with great Satisfaction that many important and salutary Powers are vested
in you for ‘promoting the Welfare and securing the blessings of liberty to the
People of the United States.’”112 From these powers, they argued, it followed
that it was reasonable to expect that “nothing which can be done [by
Congress] . . . will be either omitted or delayed,” in ensuring “that these

106. Con-g-ss Emark’d on Board the Ship Constitution of America Bound to
Conogocheque by Way of Philadelphia (illustration) (1790), in BERNARD F. REILLY JR.,
AMERICAN POLITICAL PRINTS, 1776–1876, at 179 (1991).
107. See generally Craig Green, United/States: A Revolutionary History of American
Statehood, 119 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2020).
108. See KATHLEEN BARTOLONI-TUAZON, FOR FEAR OF AN ELECTIVE KING: GEORGE
WASHINGTON AND THE PRESIDENTIAL TITLE CONTROVERSY OF 1789 (2014).
109. See generally Corey M. Brooks, Reconsidering Politics in the Study of American
Abolitionists, 8 J. CIV. WAR ERA 291, 296 (2018) (summarizing the recent historiography of
American abolitionism and works that have illustrated early efforts by antislavery activists to
abolish slavery through the political process); Nicholas P. Wood, A “Class of Citizens”: The
Earliest Black Petitioners to Congress and Their Quaker Allies, 74 WM. & MARY Q. 109
(2017) (tracing early Black petitions submitted to Congress in pursuit of individual freedom
claims).
110. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1239–40 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834); Letter from
William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge (Feb. 13, 1790), reprinted in George C. Rogers
Jr., The Letters of William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge (pt. 2), 69 S.C. HIST. MAG.
101, 103 (1968).
111. See Memorial of the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the Abolition of Slavery to
the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States, supra note 2.
112. Id.
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blessings ought rightfully to be administered, without distinction of Colour,
to all descriptions of People.”113
According to the conventional frame of analysis that commentators have
used to analyze the subsequent debates that gave rise to the doctrine of
noninterference,114 we might expect to see any number of responses to this
call for federal action. On the one hand, we might expect to find a debate
that sounded in the register of sovereign states seeking to protest the
encroachment of a distant central government or perhaps, one premised on
brokered compromises between two emerging Northern and Southern
regional blocks. And to be sure, elements of states’ rights and sectional
compromises appear throughout the records.115 But as this part argues,
participants in the newly created U.S. Congress did not confine themselves
to the reified blocks of jurisdictional space and sectional space that have
preoccupied historians’ attention. Instead, those whose words were
transcribed, recorded, and ultimately published in newspapers and pamphlets
across the new republic spoke of an America in the language of the coast, in
which the commercial partnerships born of the exigencies of the soil and
based on principles of mutual advantage and discretionary authority supplied
a crucial justification for the legal relations between the newly united states.
To observe this mode of constitutional discourse that began with the coast
and its existing principles of partnership, we can begin by analyzing one of
the published speeches from the debates, penned by Representative William
Loughton Smith, an influential lawyer from South Carolina whose words
appeared in newspaper coverage of the proceedings.116 Hailing from an elite
family in Charleston, South Carolina, Smith was familiar with the
commercial networks and conduits that linked the planters and their agents
to the merchants of the northward and abroad.117 From the outset of the
debates, Smith had insisted that no one in Congress seriously considered the
possibility that the Constitution gave the federal government power to
interfere with the institution. As Smith wrote to Edward Rutledge on
February 13, 1790, “[t]he Members who wished a commitment [of the
petition] have assured me that it was done purely out of a compliment to the
Petitioners & that they are sensible the House cannot in any respect
interfere.”118 In an effort to clarify and settle this shared norm that the
“House cannot in any respect interfere,” Smith began drafting a formal

113. Id.; see also 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1240 (1790).
114. See supra note 25.
115. See, e.g., 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1240 (1790) (“He feared the commitment of it would
be a very alarming circumstance to the Southern States; for if the object was to engage
Congress in an unconstitutional measure, it would be considered as an interference with their
rights . . . .”); see also id. at 1243 (“[H]e conceived it to be a business within the province of
the State Legislatures.”).
116. See Extracts from the Proceedings of the House of Representatives of the United
States, VA. GAZETTE & ALEXANDRIA ADVERTISER, July 22, 1790 (reprinting Smith’s speech).
117. See GEORGE C. ROGERS JR., EVOLUTION OF A FEDERALIST 97 (1962).
118. Letter from William Loughton Smith to Edward Rutledge, supra note 110, at 103.
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opinion, which he presented to the House of Representatives on March 17 in
the form of a speech, later reprinted for public audiences.119
The first thing to note about Smith’s opinion explaining why Congress had
no power to interfere in the institution of slavery is his construction of the
relevant constitutional landscape. Rather than remaining confined to a
constitutional landscape defined by thirteen states, two feuding sections, and
one central government, Smith offered readers a verbal portrait of the old
American coastline, as defined by the nature of the land and the movement
of the ships that hauled in from the northward to carry the produce of the
plantations to market. In his exposition, Smith called on his colleagues to
consider the “nature of the soil” along the plantation coast.120 This soil, he
insisted, was one that could only be cultivated by enslaved labor.121 “Indigo,
cochineal, and various other dying materials, which are the produce of the
West Indies, could only be raised by the slaves; the great staple commodities
of the South would be annihilated without the labor of Slaves,” Smith
asserted.122 From these staple commodities, Smith then turned to the
networks of commerce that depended on the labor of the enslaved. “If the
low country is deserted,” Smith hypothesized, “where will be the commerce,
the valuable exports of that country, the large revenue raised from its imports
and from the consumption of the rich planters?”123 Moving from this
interconnected network of the merchants and planters of America, Smith then
warned of the dangers that would result if the chains of commerce were
broken between the northward and the southward. “The States are links of
one chain: if we break one, the whole must fall to pieces,” he declared.124
“If you injure the Southern States, the injury would reach our Northern and
Eastern brethren.”125
In presenting this spoken portrait of an interlinked internal economy of
America whose stakeholders shared an interest in the underlying modes of
production, Smith tapped into a well-established tradition of political thought
that had long emphasized the importance of commerce as the basis for a
thriving society.126 At a time when the legal concept of a “united state”

119. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1503–14 (1790).
120. Id. at 1510.
121. Id. at 1513.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See generally ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS (Ryan Patrick
Hanley ed., Penguin Classics 2010) (1761); Daniel Hulsebosch, The Revolutionary Portfolio:
Constitution-Making and the Wider World in the American Revolution, 47 SUFFOLK U. L. REV.
759 (2014). For a helpful interpretation of what Smith meant by sentiments, see EMMA
ROTHSCHILD, ECONOMIC SENTIMENTS: ADAM SMITH, CONDORCET, AND THE ENLIGHTENMENT
11 (2001) (defining economic sentiments as “the principles of those who govern and the way
in which they are modified by the spirit of those who are governed”). On the reception of
Smith’s writings, see, for example, Edward G. Bourne, Alexander Hamilton and Adam Smith,
3 Q.J. ECON. 328 (1894); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Mann Randolph
(May 30, 1790), as reprinted in 3 CATALOGUE OF THE LIBRARY OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 438
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remained inchoate, politicians looked to the realm of long-distance
commerce for norms on which to build an enduring and long-lasting polity,
abiding by a belief in commerce as the primary means of sociability.127
This theoretical importance of the commercial pathways along the
American coast had been brought into sharp material relief by the economic
crises of the 1780s, as it became clear to many merchants in New England
that their counterparts in Great Britain were determined to monopolize the
carrying of plantation commodities to the markets of Europe. “Great-Britain
is endeavouring, by every means in her power, to annihilate [the carrying
trade],” one observer had reported in Providence, Rhode Island.128 She was
“depriving our ships of the privilege of carrying the produce of our own
country,” while the “subjects of that nation are permitted to send their vessels
to any part of the continent for bread, flour, tobacco, rice, &c. and to ship
them from most of the States upon the same terms with our own subjects.”129
The burden, some said, fell squarely on the New England merchants and
property owners, who could appear in print as a unit interchangeable with the
newly created New England states. “Of all people,” wrote one observer in
New York, “I pity the New-England States most. Their commerce is good
for nothing on the present plan. Independence at present is no blessing to
them in the way of trade; for from the regulations of Great-Britain they can
have little or none of the carrying business.”130
By appealing directly to these established traditions of political thought
and assertions of economic necessity, Smith and his colleagues who conjured
up an image of the old American coast seized on the opportunity presented
by the petition to lay out the legal basis of noninterference with the institution
of slavery. In doing so, they offered two distinct justifications for the
doctrine of noninterference, both of which rested on conceptualizing the
newly created sovereign states not simply as peripheries to the central
government or subparts of feuding sections but as individual property owners
who had been engaged in interjurisdictional commercial exchange along the
American coast for generations.
The first of these justifications rested on the familiar principle that property
owners had a right to exclude nonowners.131 One could hear this principle
come alive in the early days of the debate, as disputants readily analogized
(Millicent E. Sowerby ed., 1953) (“[I]n political economy I think Smith’s wealth of nations
the best book extant . . . .”).
127. This particular logic of mutual dependencies would continue to sound across the
nineteenth century. See, e.g., CONG. GLOBE, 36th Cong., 1st Sess. 1616 (1860) (“Add . . . the
profits of the coasting trade, which are very great, and of which the North has a monopoly, . . .
and you may have some conception of the importance of slavery and of the South to the people
of the North. Destroy these resources, and what becomes of the shipping, manufacturing,
mercantile parts of your States, and of the vast interests dependent on them?”).
128. Circular, PROVIDENCE GAZETTE & COUNTRY J., May 21, 1785.
129. Id.
130. Extract of a Letter Dated New-York, June 22, 1785, STATE GAZETTE OF S.C., July 11,
1785 (emphasis added).
131. For the conceptual framework of property rules governing relations between strangers
and sharers, see Merrill, supra note 17.
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the sovereign states to individual property owners asserting their right to
exclude unwanted strangers. When, for example, Smith first set out in
February of 1790 to explain why the House should refuse to accept the
abolitionists’ petition, he invited his audience to consider an individual
property owner who had traveled up from the plantation coast, passed
through Philadelphia, and made his way to New York, only to find strangers
in the gallery who sought to meddle with his claims of enslaved property in
clear violation of the duty of noninterference. “A gentleman can hardly come
from that country with a servant or two, either to this place or Philadelphia,
but there are persons trying to seduce his servants to leave,” Smith began.132
The rule to be applied in such scenarios was simple. “[T]hey should . . . not
interfere with a business in which they are not interested.”133 Others
concurred. “The men in the gallery had come here to meddle in a business
with which they have nothing to do,” observed Congressman Aedanus Burke
of South Carolina.134
While disputants had little difficulty applying this in rem rule of exclusion
to the mass of unknown strangers who might descend on the enslavers of the
American coast, Smith and his colleagues also offered a second justification:
one that began with the premise that property owners who had a pecuniary
interest in the institution of slavery had a right to weigh in on the future of
the institution. To hear this starting premise, listen, for example, as
Congressman John Page of Virginia began his remarks. Before speaking on
the merits of the institution, Page clarified that he had a right to speak by
virtue of his economic interest in the business of slavery. As he explained
by way of a preface, “he . . . was as much interested in the business as any
gentleman in South Carolina or Georgia,” before announcing his judgment
of the matter.135 Applying the same principles, Congressman James Jackson
of Georgia observed that if the strangers in the galleries who had presented
the petition also had the funds to purchase the property in question, then of
course they would have the right to speak on the matter of slavery. “I would
beg to ask those, then, who are desirous of freeing the negroes, if they have
funds sufficient to pay for them? If they have, they may come forward on
the business with some propriety; but, if they have not, they should keep
themselves quiet.”136
Set against this background understanding that interested parties, but not
strangers, had a right to “come forward,” Smith and his colleagues framed
the federal rule of noninterference in a way that would have resonated with
those along the coast who had participated in the trade for generations. More
specifically, instead of simply presenting the doctrine of noninterference as
a bright-line rule among strangers—a justification that would have made
little sense to the close-knit merchant community who had engaged in
132. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1244 (1790) (Joseph Gales ed., 1834).
133. Id. at 1228; see also id. at 1227 (statement of Rep. Michael Jenifer Stone) (“[T]he
petitioners had no more right to interfere with it than any other members of the community.”).
134. Id. at 1227.
135. Id. at 1246.
136. Id. at 1228.
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commercial exchange along the coast for over a century and a half—Smith
and his colleagues also framed the rule of noninterference as one that
emerged from the informed and willing consent of partners bound in links of
mutual dependence.137
Consider, for example, how Smith characterized the nature of the legal
relationship between the states. Rather than analogizing the states to the
strangers in the room who were in need of a bright-line rule of
noninterference, Smith honed in on the informed citizens of the Northern
states who understood the importance of the institution of slavery to the
political economy and knowingly acquiesced in its preservation.138 “The
truth was,” Smith explained,
that the best informed part of the citizens of the Northern States knew that
slavery was so ingrafted into the policy of the Southern states, that it could
not be eradicated without tearing up by the roots their happiness, tranquility
and prosperity; that if it were an evil, it was one for which there was no
remedy, and therefore, like wise men, they acquiesced in it.139

Having directed his audience’s attention to the “best informed part of the
citizens,”140 Smith then cited the act of informed acquiescence as the basis
for a compact of noninterference: “There was then an implied compact
between the Northern and Southern people that no step should be taken to
injure the property of the latter, or to disturb their tranquility.”141 The result,
he continued, was that those deemed to be in the best position to regulate the
institution of slavery were assured full discretionary authority over its
governance. “[The Southern States] were the only proper judges of what was
for their interest,” he explained, invoking the familiar logic of the American
coast.142 Based on this agreed upon compact, he concluded, “no other State
had any right to intermeddle with her policy or laws.”143
In presenting this justification for noninterference, Smith had thus rooted
the federal consensus not simply in today’s familiar logic of a state’s
primordial autonomy from a distant center or a regional compromise between
sections but in an older logic of commercial partnership rooted in the promise
of mutual advantage and discretionary authority between coequal parties to
a long-term agreement. Perhaps even more strikingly, Smith also made
explicit the underlying ideology of racial ordering that had coursed through
the merchant correspondence of the coast for generations. Appealing directly
to biological constructs of race, Smith argued that failure to abide by this
implied compact of noninterference would not only destroy the profits on
which the property owners of America depended; it would destroy the future
of the white race. “A proper consideration of this business,” he advised,
137. Id. at 1508.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1507 (stating there were no petitions against slavery from the Southern states,
and they were the only proper judges of what was for their interest).
143. Id.
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must convince every candid mind, that emancipation would be attended
with one or other of these consequences; either that a mixture of the races
would degenerate the whites, without improving the blacks, or that it would
create two separate classes of people in the community . . . which would
terminate in the massacre and extirpation of one or the other.144

By invoking this prospect of the “degeneration” of the white race and
warning of the ensuing violence that would result in the absence of
enslavement, Smith thus concluded his defense of the foundational rule of
noninterference not with appeals to states’ rights or sectional compromises
but to an ideology of whiteness and racial subjugation that could course
across the formal jurisdictional and sectional lines of America.
Grounded in a constitutional landscape that featured a single organic
American coastline bound by underlying norms of commercial partnership
and a racial hierarchy of whiteness, Smith’s opinion found a ready audience.
Throughout the debates, men who had come of age along the American
coastline moved easily between speaking of the well-settled rights of
individual property owners and the still inchoate sovereign rights. In doing
so, they, like Smith, borrowed from the familiar rules of strangers and sharers
to articulate what would become the rule of noninterference for a union of
states as commercial partners. “The rights of the Southern States ought not
to be threatened, and their property endangered, to please people who would
be unaffected by the consequences,” announced Burke, working from the
premise that strangers could not interfere with property rights.145 Likewise,
when Congressman Abraham Baldwin referred to the question of property
holdings in the compact of the Confederation, he too spoke in the language
of the coast, warning that failure to abide by the careful agreements that had
been enacted would compromise the entire venture:
[F]rom the extreme desire of preserving the Union, and obtaining an
efficient Government, [the members of the Southern States] were induced
mutually to concede, and the Constitution jealously guarded what they
agreed to. If gentlemen look over the footsteps of that body, they will find
the greatest degree of caution used to imprint them, so as not to be easily
eradicated; but the moment we go to jostle on that ground, I fear we shall
feel it tremble under our feet.146

By no means limited to delegates from the Southern states, congressmen
from the northward who had long participated in the political economy of the
coast readily applied the same framework, presenting Congress as an
assembly of states, each bound by a duty of noninterference that could be
analogized to individual property owners. Listen, for example, to how the
merchant Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts explained the scope of the right
of Congress’s power to purchase the population of enslaved people in the
Southern states. Rather than analyzing the question according to a contest
between center and periphery or North versus South, Gerry presented
144. Id. at 1508.
145. Id. at 1413–17.
146. Id. at 1242.
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Congress as a composite of states that collectively had the right to make an
offer to buy enslaved persons, a right no different than the individual
petitioners who had assembled in the audience. “Congress have a right, if
they see proper,” he advised, “to make a proposal to the Southern States to
purchase the whole of them.”147 Speaking of Congress in the plural, he
continued: “He did not intend to suggest a measure of this kind; he only
instanced these particulars to show that Congress certainly has a right to
intermeddle in the business.”148
As intelligible to the planters of the southward as it was to these merchants
of the northward, this principle of noninterference that had long coursed
through the commercial records of the old American coast now appeared in
the codified records of the Congress of the United States. In lieu of justifying
the principle with appeals to states’ rights or sectional political bargains, the
authors of the final committee report simply declared what some presumed
to have been obvious from the start.149 “Congress have no authority to
interfere in the emancipation of slaves, or in the treatment of them within any
of the States,” the final report read, “it remaining with the several States alone
to provide any regulations therein, which humanity and true policy may
require.”150 For many observers, this rule that codified the practices of the
coast was hardly a surprise. “Such things” as a federal abolition power,
observed James Madison, “are not contemplated by any gentleman.”151
Others concurred. “I believe there is not a wish of the kind entertained by
any member of this body that Congress intend to exercise an unconstitutional
authority, in order to violate their rights,” echoed another.152 Rooted in the
material realities and long-established norms of commercial partnership of
the old Atlantic coast, this principle of noninterference had washed ashore
into the records of Congress, as the ships down at the harbor continued to
sail, carrying the produce of the plantations to market.
CONCLUSION
Long after the debates of the First Congress had concluded in the spring
of 1790 and the ink on the House report had dried, legal scholars in America’s
first law schools began to divide up the American coast into discrete units of
constitutional time and space.153 As familiar today as the flag itself, this is a
conceptual map that has cast a long shadow across the field, one that
accentuates the founding era’s fragments by featuring isolated peripheries
whose only bond was that of deference to a distant central government and
whose competing labor systems would soon splinter into sections. Working
from this familiar map, scholars have tended to read the federal consensus as
147. Id. at 1246.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1524.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1246.
152. Id. at 1188.
153. See Maeve Glass, The Creation of a Public Law Paradigm, 60 HIST. & THEORY
(forthcoming 2021).
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either the lingering vestige of colonial-era parochialism or a one-time
political bargain designed to help secure votes for pending legislation.
This Essay has invited us to peer beyond this inherited map of America’s
founding and expand the analytical lens. By sketching out the possibilities
of a constitutional landscape that encompasses the economic space of the
American coast, I have suggested how a more expansive archive can both
enrich our understanding of the norms of commercial partnership as well as
sharpen our tradition of the norms of constitutional partnership that appeared
in the formal records of Congress. In doing so, this more expansive archive
invites us to see how the doctrine of noninterference that allowed slavery in
America to flourish across the nineteenth century traced its most enduring
roots not to a land of isolated fragments and feuding sections but to a much
older America, one predicated on the promise of mutual advantage from and
noninterference with the institution of racial slavery and the atrocities upon
which it rested.

